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What sort of connection exists between corporate governance and performance? Can the 
improvement of Governance of a company contributing to increase profitability? I will try to 
answer this question by exhibiting numerical proof studying one particular sector (utilities) in the 
Italian stock exchange FITSEMIB in the years 2003-2015 following the introduction of a 
particular corporate governance code (Codice Preda). I take 28 listed companies in the 
FITSEMIB (The Italian stock exchange) operating in particular in the Utility and 
telecommunication services, with 15 year data involving on one side variables such as: Members 
of the Board, Ceo Duality, Number of independent directors, Number of non executive directors 
and on the other side performance variables as: Roe, Roa, Tobin’s Q. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The OECD defines corporate governance "as the measures and the procedures according to 
which a business is directed and controlled. Henceforth the distribution of entitlements and 
obligations among the diverse partakers in the organization – such as the board of directors, 
managers, shareholders, and other stakeholders – and sets down the rules and procedures for 
decision-making". (Rossana Bubbico, 2012) Another definition is the one given by Bolton, 
Romano and Baghat as “Corporate Governance is the set of processes that provides as assurance 
to outside investors of a fair return of their investment” (Roberta Romano, 2008). 
A fair rising interest committed to corporate governance can be described in light of famous 
business scandals like Tyco, Freddie Mac, Cirio and Parmalat in Italy. Everybody, from Investors 
to shareholders, is concerned in corporate governance, the Investors when it comes to finance by 
acknowledging the risks and the outcome, the shareholders in order to exploit the positive effects 
of good governance on the value and the reputation of the company. One of the most pertinent 
requirements for practitioners or he researchers has always been to measure quantitatively the 
quality of the firm’s corporate governance and the effects that a good “ Governum” may create 
on performance and on the level of risk. The issue of measuring it is still open and very delicate 
at the moment, in fact, there is not a unique methodology universally adopted. 
Considering the growing interest, numerous institutes currently rate the good corporate 
governance practices of listed firms, with mainly two different tools, as part of credit rating or as 
stand-alone. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
 
Many ratings agencies provide synthetic indexes“of governance ratings provided by Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS), The Corporate Library, and Governance Metrics International. It also 
summarizes the governance issues considered by several credit ratings agencies: Moody’s 
Investor Services, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch Ratings. Besides other studies have unlocked a 
new thread pointing to the creation of indexes (i.e. G- index) that can concentrate the contribution 
of different drivers of quality.” 
The concept of corporate governance was forged in 1932, in the book the modern corporation and 
private property, which claimed the split-up of control and ownership. In fact the main line of the 
Agency theory requires a contract and so a relationship between a principal (the owners) and an 
agent (the manager). 
Corporate governance could be very noteworthy in both finance and management studies, 
proving to be a determinant of various business dynamics. For example it can reconnect the 
performance with default risk and so the future probability of survival of the company. A riskier 
outlook for the firm can be determined either by internal operations, which are inefficient, or by a 
hostile economic environment. With the most recent economic crisis we have companies more 
exposed to situations of insolvency. 
Focusing on the population of public utilities may be of particular interest in relation to the 
research objectives. In this regard, in fact, in line with international thinking (David Osborne, 
1992), we can say indeed that the effective and efficient governance of the public utilities sector 
might be one of the utmost possible contributors to the overall competitiveness of Italy as a 
country system (Cafferata). 
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In Italy liberalization and privatization started in the nineties resulted in a series of important 
consequences, in particular, after more the ninety years of public monopoly of the services and 
the providers, I can highline: the I) gradual market opening to competition; ii) the change in 
ownership structure of the companies; iv) the transformation of the industrial development 
policy, with, for example, the listing on the Stock Exchange; v) the activation of important 
management development processes, for example, the replacements company's top management. 
Another peculiarity on the Italian economic system is definitely the major role of family 
businesses that represent a crucial component of the Italian economic structure. The family 
business is an evergreen in the research field in the country concerning its connotation and its 
contribution to the economic growth through the years, although many criticalities. There are 
groups that became larger and nowadays listed on the stock exchange or other stock markets, 
very active on acquisitions, even cross border and others that remained tiny but recognized for 
the quality of the line of products. 
The framework quickly drawn makes it clear that the study of possible effects of governance 
changes on the performance of surveyed companies can be particularly useful about the desired 
goal of the overall growth of Italy's competitiveness as a country system. 
The choice of the variables of corporate governance and performance comes from the hypothesis 
of some of the most recent national and international publications on the matter in question. In 
particular, my analysis of the corporate governance system of the population surveyed assumes, 
as a benchmark, the Italian Code of Conduct for Listed Companies (Italiana, 2015). I consider, 
specifically, variables such as: a) the annual incidence of Non-executive and independent Boards 
of Directors (BoD); b) the potential phenomenon, known as duality, of the overlap, in relation to 
a single subject, the positions of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer; c) number of the Board; 
d) the annual presence of specific Monitoring Committees and regarding the dependent variables 
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Standard indicators such as Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin's Q 
(abdelkader). 
The breakthrough analysis results do not appear to produce unequivocal conclusions and what 
appears in line with most of the empirical evidence produced to date.  
3. Literature review  
 
I develop the work as follows. I firstly investigate the theoretical framework and illustrate, then, 
the research methodology. I analyze the results and discuss, finally, the most relevant evidence in 
terms of implications for research and business practice. 
Recently there have been more and more intensely, exploratory research in order to test the 
hypothesis that there is a positive correlation between the performance of listed company shares 
the accomplishment of the top practices of corporate governance contained within Corporate 
Governance Codes internationally known (Rafael La Porta) 
However, the current empirical evidence, produced in very different national contexts with each 
other, do not allow interpretations completely convergent and unique. If we consider, for 
example, research conducted in countries with “emerging” economies, the results generally 
demonstrate that the corporate governance values have a positive correlation with the market 
value of enterprises, but the results themselves do not agree on the effect of the variables 
governance of accounting indicators (Bernard S. Black) 
Taking as reference the OECD countries, the results seem correspondingly contradictory. In U.S. 
context, for example (Paul A. Gompers, 2003), showed a very solid positive correlation between 
specific "anti-takeover" measures and Tobin's Q of the sample of firms observed, whereas (David 
F. Larcker, 2007) only attested the existence of a positive relationship, which is very anemic, 
	   8	  
between Tobin's Q and usual indicators of corporate governance. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) 
found a positive relationship between a series of corporate governance measures with some 
accounting values, while no evidence of correlation with market values as indicators of stock 
performance. Similarly, Brown and Caylor (2006) (Lawrence D. Brown a) found evidence of a 
positive effect of governance variables on Tobin's Q, while Daines (Robert M. Daines a) found 
no strong links between governance and performance ratings. 
With reference to a sample drawn from the FITSEurofirst 300, a research from Japan (Rob 
Bauera)tested the absence of a significant relationship between the variables of corporate 
governance and performance, both in terms of accounting variables, and in terms of market 
variables. Some other evidence from Germany (Wolfgang Drobetz) attests, in contrast, a positive 
relationship between corporate governance variables and the market value of a sample of German 
companies. 
On one hand, in summary, the literature suggests that the overall quality of a system of corporate 
governance, like it was quantified by the composition of specific baskets of variables, 
contributes, in general, to increase the economic and financial value of listed companies 
(Schmid). On the other hand, understanding the impact that specific variables included in this 
system can have on the company's performance seems to require even a substantial deepening. 
With reference to the latter, for example, while certain research denote that an adequate number 
of independent directors on the Board increase the profitability of a listed company (Perry, 2005), 
certain other come to opposite conclusions (Choi, 2005). Similarly, while some evidence suggests 
that a smaller size in the BoD members produces better business performance than a Board of 
larger size, the latter, however, seem to produce more stable and less inconstant performance. 
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4.Methodology  
 
This section briefly describes the research methodology adopted for the conduct of the analysis. I 
highlight, in particular: i) the steps that led to the definition of the data set; ii) the procedures for 
measurement of the dependent variables (performance); iii) the procedures for measurement of 
the independent variables (corporate governance); iv) the types of statistical analysis developed. 
I took into consideration a sample of 28 firms of the industries providing public services that we 
can find on the FITSEMIB in the period between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2015. The 
choice of this period is due to the possibility to investigate the specific adoption of special 
measures of corporate governance following the first introduction in 1999, of the Preda Code. 
The choice of this specific population requires further explanation. The interest in this type of 
businesses is, in fact, justified by the increasingly vivid awareness of the positive influence - on 
the territory competitiveness – of an effective and efficient system of public utility services, 
either by the evolution in management, organization and laws that is characterizing the 
companies included in this sector. 
First of all, as I highline, public services with low fares or lower than those of other countries / 
areas (and / or higher quality) encourage the achievement of positive results for the business 
system of a country and its area, for instance the cost of electricity and natural gas and their 
impact on production costs, or the positive impact of an efficient and widespread 
telecommunications network. 
I point out , secondly , as services can respond , in quantity, quality and prices , to the community 
needs , they can influence - and actually do - the life of a community . As,for instance, the 
importance for the citizens of efficiency and effectiveness of urban transport service , the waste 
collection service and telecommunications.  
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Regarding the second aspect, in the last two decades, it has been deeply altered the "philosophy " 
of government and management of public utility services (Head, 2001; Gilardoni, Lorenzoni, 
2013; Grandinetti, Massarutto, 2013): the loss of legitimacy of work of the public company, local 
and national; the crisis of public finance; the new " awareness" of the users - customers - citizens; 
the European Union pressures; technological development, represent some of the factors that 
triggered a deep process of change , however, not yet come to an end , aimed to efficiency and 
reduction of the public deficit. 
The joint effort of the factors outlined above contribute to the start of the liberalization and 
privatizations process  
Liberalizations take place to enable the opening to competition - in and for the market - 
traditionally operated in monopolistic sectors. Privatizations instead give the right to other 
institutions to operate in a context that before was only a public prerogative. 
Now, therefore ,I have chosen to consider , such providing services of public utility services , all 
those listed companies, in the Italian Stock Exchange ,that are included in the " utilities " , " 
energy" and " telecommunications " sectors. 




Some companies are not uninterruptedly listed during this period due to heavy crisis as Alitalia 
and some other converged in other bigger groups due to M&A processes. Moreover I tried to 
keep out companies that are listed but are also divisions or branch of bigger firm to avoid 
duplications. 
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In the elaboration of the data set, I used corporate governance reports and other business 
documents, such as, balance sheet and financial statements and data from Bloomberg. Given the 
number of companies I carried out a total of 351 observations that are pretty consistent with some 
studies published in international scientific journals. The variables with the labels and the 







The literature is vast about the three indexes ROE, ROA and but the Tobin’s Q might deserve a 
little explanation. The Tobin's Q ratio is "a ratio that the combined market value of all the 
companies on the stock market should be about equal to their replacement costs." 
For instance, "a low Q (between 0 and 1) means that the cost to replace a firm's assets is greater 
than the value of its stock. This implies that the stock is undervalued. Equally, a high Q (greater 
than 1) implies that a firm's stock is more expensive than the replacement cost of its assets, which 
implies that the stock is overvalued (Investopedia)."This measure of stock valuation is the  
driving factor behind investment decisions in Tobin’s model. As control variable I use the GDP 
for every year. This variable has the specific porpoise to reduce the error and enhance the 
sensitivity of the statistic tests and on the other side to compensate, in part, fluctuations due to 
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different observations, otherwise hardly manageable. Below I show the variable’s description as 
shown in the code taking into consideration some of the most significant articles for this paper. 
5.	  The	  Preda	  code	  
 
2) Executive and non-executive directors  
“The Board of Directors consists of executive and non- executive directors. The Code states that 
non-executive directors make changes to their specific expertise to board discussions and 
contribute to decisions paying particular attention to areas where conflicts of interest may occur. 
The Code recommends that the number, competences, authority and available time of non-
executive directors are such to ensure that their judgment carries significant weight in the Board 
decisions.” 
2c) Separation between chairman and Ceo. 
“The code supports the formal separation of the two responsibilities. In the event that the 
Chairman of the Board is primarily responsible for managing the company ( Chief Executive 
Officer ) , as well as in the event that the chairman is held by the same controlling person, the 
Board shall appoint an independent director as lead independent director , who represents a point 
of reference and coordinate requests and contributions of non- executive directors and, in 
particular , those who are independent .” 
3) Independent directors. 
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“The Code recommends that an appropriate number of non-executive directors are independent 
and that the number and competences of independent directors shall be adequate in relation to the 
size of the board and the activity performed by the issuer”  
 
5) Appointment of directors 
“The Committee recommends that for the appointment of directors to be laid down to ensure the 
transparency of the process and a balanced composition of the board , in particular by ensuring 
the presence of an adequate number of independent directors . To this end , issuers are required to 
determine whether it is set up within the board of directors , a nomination committee , composed 
of a majority of independent directors “ 
7) Internal control and risk management system 
“The Code recommends that the Board of Directors the creation, within itself, of a committee for 
internal Control System, composed of non-executive directors, the majority of whom are 
independent. If another listed company controls the issuer, the Committee for Internal Control is 
composed exclusively of independent directors.”  
 
The variables shown in the table 2 below,  are the starting point for building the corporate 
governance indicators of this analysis. In this regard, in fact, while it is true that acceptance of the 
Preda Code occurs, even today, on a voluntary basis, on the other hand it is strongly supported by 
institutions. The companies that do not prepare corporate governance reports, must, in fact, 
periodically motivate to the Italian Stock Exchange the reasons for this choice. On the basis of 
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On the choice of the variables listed in the last table, however, I should say that in the studies on 
corporate governance, the central and potentially problematic question focuses precisely on the 
development of an acceptable and shared definition of the concept of " good governance " In this 
regard, their adherence to the principles of the Preda Code - which, in line with the promulgated 
standards internationally, are derived from basic assumptions of agency theory - can substantiate 
a formal element of evaluation about the quality of the corporate system governance in Italy. Two 
of the most important are definitely the ownership structure and the board composition that could 
explain the dependent variables. There are findings (in the USA) Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) 
underlining a big board in negatively related with performances and others (in Japan) Kaplan and 
Minton (1994) that show the opposite. In Europe many codes of best practice indicate the 
separation of the Ceo from the chairman as sign of virtuous managing choice, creating 
equilibrium between power and authority, but there is no evidence of relevant impact on the firm 
performances. Furthermore it is believed that a higher fraction of independent directors carries an 
enhanced supervising and so in my model I consider this variable as a good corporate governance 
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measure. I would like to highlight the fact that perhaps the good governance could also go over 
the widely-held firms, composition of the board, type of directors and focus on reshaping case by 
case the company practices depending on the peculiarity of it. Some examples are the agency 
problem between minority shareholders and the ownership, the dual class shares or the liquidity 
of shares. That said, the selected variables are commonly used by the existing literature on the 
subject, because they are considered the most suitable to discern the structural functioning of the 
Board. It seems appropriate underline also that the two tier system is adopted by just one 
company which is A2A.At the end of 2015 indeed out of 268 listed company in Italy just a 3% 
had embraced the new system and the majority of them keeps the old one. Probably the reason is 
to be sought in the lack of regulation either in Borsa Italiana Code or the civil code, which always 
send back to the traditional system. This together with a poor knowledge of the one-tier and two–
tier system explains the results. 
6.Adopted models around the world 
 
Observing around, what are the most widespread models in the developed economies around the 
world? In 40 countries (OECD countries plus Argentina, brazil, Indonesia, China, Hong Kong, 
Saudi Arabia and Singapore) 20 have moved to the one-tier system and 7 to the two-tier. There 
are 13 countries that have decided to move to a more flexible model, giving the enterprises 
independence regarding the model to implement, in particular only Italy, Portugal and Japan have 
hybrid system and specific of the countries. The difference between the Italian system and the 
rest of the word is far from insignificant, often the multinationals struggle to understand the big 
differences in Italy and this does not facilitate the attraction for them to invest in the country 
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considering that the weight of international investors in the FITSE MIB grew from 12% in 2010 
to 17% in 2015 and the majority of them are Americans or English. 
 
7. Instruments of governance 
Corporate governance can be translated like a structure of mechanisms institutional and market-
based—that encourages self-interested directors (managers of the firm) to pick and make 
decisions that expand the value of the company to its shareholders (owners of the firm). The 
purpose of all the available instruments, obviously, is to diminish the agency costs out coming 
from the principle-agent theory, which might be coming from outside the firm or outside. In-
house tools deal with the ownership organization or the degree at which ownership by 
administrators precludes the compromise amid association and entrenchment effects. Alternative 
significant inner instrument is the organization of the board, such as the difference between the 
chief executive officer and the chairman or president, and the fraction of independent and non-
executive directors. Other instruments, on the other hand, specifically count on the M&A market 
in addition to the legal/regulatory set of rules, through which the takeover market turns as a threat 
to current controllers in that it enables outsiders to seek control of the firm if bad corporate 
governance results in a significant gap between the potential and the actual value of the firm 
(even though the take over instrument seems to be significant just in the US). So, since this 
explanation we can figure out that the legal system is just one method to good governance. Not 
only that, but existing suggestion also shows that the effective presence of the other mechanisms 
is positively associated with firm value. Taken together, the corporate governance system of a 
firm attempts to align incentives of managers with those of shareholders, and therefore stimulate 
managers to work tougher toward increasing company value. Moreover it is argued that countries 
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that follow civil law, in particular French civil law, and so Italy is included; provide investors 
with weaker legal rights and protection than common law does (La Porta et al., 1998). Due to the 
lack of legal protection for investors, internal corporate governance mechanisms can offer a 
substitute to such frail external mechanisms. More specifically, "in the lack of strong laws that 
protect minority shareholders, investors seek to own a significant proportion of the firm equity to 
protect their interests and to exercise control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In other words, when 
the legal context does not offer adequate protection for outside investors, entrepreneurs and 
original owners are forced to maintain large positions in their companies, which result in a 
concentrated form of ownership”. 
8. Type of empirical Analysis  
 
Using the software Stata, I run a test with panel data through a linear regression with the fixed 
effects method. In particular I wrote down these 3 regressions. 
Roe = α+β1Bod+ β2Ceod+ β3intcc+ β4com+ β5Ned+ β6Indd+ ε 
 
Roa = α+ β1Bod+ β2Ceod+ β3intcc+ β4com+ β5Ned+ β6Indd+ ε 
 
Tobin’s Q = α+ β1Bod+ β2Ceod+ β3intcc+ β4com+ β5Ned+ β6Indd+ ε 
 
 
I tried to eliminate the non-significant variables through the stepwise methodology, which is 
useful whenever group of variables must be taken off the model in relation to their significance. 
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9. Discussions over the results 
 
My work can help and lead to interesting thoughts everyone who, considering the performance is 
called to project and structure all the control and management bodies. The analysis that I carried 
out, entitled into question many issues that have been center of debate among corporate 
governance experts for many years and probably will be for a long time still. Accordingly the 
table shows the key statistics of the population taken into consideration during the given period. 
These, shown in table 3 and 4, are for each variable: Average; maximum value; minimum value; 
standard deviation; variance. 
Table	  3	  
 





A brief analysis of the table will clear up some doubts. First of all looking at the corporate 
governance variables we can notice the committee for internal control a really high average with 
0.8275 with almost the totality of the companies having it. The nominee committee has a little 
lower value with 0.6206 but still relevant. The board has an average of roughly 10 (9.7241), 
which is pretty high. Regarding the performance variables the highest value of the Tobin’s Q is 
mainly due to the overcapitalization of Acotel Group in 2000 and the average is over 1 
(1.239850).  
Below I show the results of the regressions, from which, I can draw some conclusions. The 
relationship between Roe and the independent variables does not explicate any rapport, and this is 
actually consistent with other studies; so I might say that probably the Roe does not fit this kind 
of investigation. Secondly the presence of duality is not associated with any performance, so it 
likely does not affect the firm value. Noting the Tobin’s Q the model does explicate (R2 = 
0.3955). The proportion of non-executive directors is inversely correlated with the Tobin’s Q and 
is significant due to a p-value of 0.036 as well as with the number of members of the board. In 
general those relationships present a good level of significance. Speaking about the Roa and the 
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other variables the model is fairly significant (R2 = 0,3471) mainly due to the weight of the 
independent directors on the boards and the negative correlation between Roa and committee for 
the nominees. 
I also would highlight that the GDP control variable is very significant affecting heavily all the 
other variables. 
 
It is palpable how complex is the emerging analysis, above all, considering the fact that as we can 
notice the same variables of corporate governance tend to have different kind of correlations with 
the dependent variables. One example can be considered in the role of the non-executive directors 
and the and in particular the rough debate around it. Some research denotes, how the presence of 
such figures can positively affect the company performances, while others, shows exactly the 
opposite. As we can see gives similar conclusions, in fact, the non-executive directors variable 
Table	  5	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has a negative correlation with the Tobin’s Q but does not have any relationship with the others. 
Nevertheless this could suggest us that the investors tend to consider managers more involved a 
plus for the strategies of a firm. The size of the board got also a light positive correlation with the 












This investigation may be worthwhile to students and / or business managers interested in 
increasing their knowledge about possible relationships between structure and composition of the 
leading bodies and the operating performance of the business. From the results obtained, in fact, I 
can highlight a number of other implications for research and practice on the subject. In this 
research I pondered the relationship between corporate governance and performance but I did not 
measured the general trend of the former. So the question whether or not the corporate 
governance system has been improved is still on hold. 
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Actually that was not the question I have been trying to answer with this work, nevertheless, can 
result interesting and supportive, to the extent of interpreting some results. 
Moreover I should take into account that the study of the relationship between governance and 
performance produces results that on the other hand often lead to a broader argument relating to 
the possible ties with related corporate strategies . This is particulary relevant if considering the 
nature of the dataset . Many times I pointed out, in this regard, that the Italian public utilities have 
been, especially in the last 20 years, the object and subject of radical changes . 
Specifically several models studied in the literature can lead to the full understanding of business 
performance only through the analysis of internal changes within enterprise mainly thanks to the 
liberalization and privatization. Usually these changes affect the top management, strategy and 
business structure. It also seems appropriate to underline those relations amongst other external 
factors (i.e. changing rules, competition, markets) and internal ones (i.e. real independence of 
directors, corporate culture, sharing of corporate mission) play a very critical role in establishing 
the path for a long-term firm’s success. Furthermore internal factors such as who actually sits on 
the boards or the intensity of the phenomena of interlocking directorate, the person chairing the 
various control committees, or if behind the formal role of independent directors there are 
qualified figures. Or as last examples how the internal processes beneath the governance organs 
and which kind of impact may have on the performances. Some qualitative aspects might help at 
understanding the theoretical and practical knowledge of these analyses. I recall here referring to 
the type of analysis or rather through the vital use of secondary data. This kind of analysis, very 
widespread, has numerous perks including that of underlining quantitatively some relevant traits 
in corporate governance such the members of a board or the presence or absence of specific 
bodies inside. Obviously I cannot leave aside the qualitative aspects that the literature covers 
through the analysis of the relationship between the member’s socio-demographic characteristics 
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and corporate strategies. Indeed there are analysis theoretical model in which is demonstrated that 
business strategies are highly influenced by cognitive qualities and background of the members 
of the company (cultural background, age, remuneration, heterogeneity, other professional 
experience). This line of study has produced a large set of relevant empiric relations between 
those features and some processes like M&A, innovation, diversification and internationalization. 
Lately in order to comprehend the internal dynamics of ruling, this front has also suggested an in-
depth analysis of personality traits of executives, above all, those traits such as narcissism, 
dynamism and confidence. Nevertheless this fascinating line of research seems more a question 
mark considering the literature and some existing publication on the topic like psychology and 
management or behavior and finance. It is understandable how this lack might lead to a natural 
bias. 
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